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The Future of Mandatory Employee
Arbitration Agreements
Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki'
I. INTRODUCTION
The legality of Employee Arbitration Agreements has been a hotly debated
issue,2 and agreements that contain mandatory arbitration provisions or require
waiver of class or collective actions have been at the center of the debate. In deci-
sions such as Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB" or " the Board") has determined that, under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act ("NLRA" or "the Act"), mandatory employee arbitration agreements are
invalid.4 At the same time, judicial decisions under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA") have developed a liberal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.5 This split of authority has implications for decision makers trying to
interpret and apply the law, employers trying to utilize arbitration agreements, and
employees seeking to maintain their guaranteed rights.
First, this note examines the historical interpretations of arbitration agree-
ments under the FAA and the NLRA. Next, it explores the reasoning behind the
discrepancies that exist between the judicial and administrative arbitration deci-
sions. Additionally, this note assesses the lack of a uniform standard and its effect
on decision makers, employers, and employees. Lastly, this note evaluates the
potential implications of a liberal policy favoring arbitration in the context of
mandatory employee arbitration agreements.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Lisa K. Fikki began working as a graduate admissions counselor for Ever-
glades College, Inc. ("Everglades College" or "the College"), in 2008.6 In 2011,
Everglades College decided to eliminate all of its paper employment records.
Consequently, in 2012, the College required its current employees to complete an
electronic process whereby each employee was required to sign or initial various
employment documents and policies, including an Employee Arbitration Agree-
ment ("EAA" or "Agreement"). The four-page EAA required, in pertinent part
that: any employment-related claim be resolved through binding arbitration; a
1. Case 12-CA-096026, 2013 WL 4140317 (N.L.R.B Div. of Judges) (August 14, 2013).
2. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); In Re D. R.
Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
3. Id.
4. See generally Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317; In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357
NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012).
5. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
6. Case 12-CA-096026, 2013 WL 4140317 at *7. Everglades College, Inc. was a non-profit, pri-
vate corporation that was doing business as Keiser University and Everglades University. Id.
7. Id. at *4.
8. Id.
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class or collective action waiver; and an acknowledgement of the right to be rep-
resented by independent legal counsel.9 Fikki, who was among the current em-
ployees required to complete this electronic process, was told that signing or ini-
tialing the documents was a condition of continuing employment.10
Fikki was informed that the electronic process was to be completed by the ini-
tial deadline of June 22, 2012.11 However, Everglades College's Chancellor and
Chief Executive Officer advised current employees that a deadline extension was
available to employees who produced a letter from an attorney, prior to the dead-
line, that verified the employee had an appointment with the attorney.12 Fikki,
who intended to seek legal advice regarding the EAA, complied with the exten-
sion guidelines, by submitting a letter that indicated Fikki would meet with an
attorney, on July 18, 2012. Everglades College's Associate Vice Chancellor of
Human Resources subsequently informed Fikki that the deadline was extended
only to July 10, 2012 for all employees and that Fikki should make the necessary
arrangements to complete the electronic process in time to meet the new deadline.
14 Fikki did not meet with an attorney prior to the July 10 deadline, did not com-
plete the required electronic process, and was discharged on July 12, 2012.15
In early 2013, Fikki filed a charge with the NLRB, and the Board subsequent-
ly issued a complaint against Everglades College, Inc. 16 The complaint alleged
that Everglades College violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA" when it (1) re-
9. Id. at *5-6; "[Clause] 6. Arbitration of Claims. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relat-
ing to Employee's employment, Employee's separation from employment, and this Agreement, includ-
ing, but not limited to, claims or actions brought pursuant to federal, state, or local laws regarding
payment of wages, tort, discrimination, harassment and retaliation, except where specifically prohibit-
ed by law, shall be referred to and finally resolved exclusively by binding arbitration . . . Employee
agrees that there will be no right or authority, and hereby waives any right or authority, for any claims
within the scope of this Agreement to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a class or collective action, or
in a representative or private attorney general capacity on behalf of a class of persons or the general
public .... [Clause] 11. Independent Legal Counsel. Each party hereby acknowledges that said party
has had ample opportunity to seek independent legal counsel, and has been represented by, or has
otherwise waived its right to be represented by, such independent legal counsel, with respect to the
negotiation and execution of this Agreement." Id. Also, the EAA required employees to "reimburse
[Everglades College] for all costs and expenses arising out of a breach of the agreement." Id. at *16.
10. Id. at *9. Not only was Fikki told that signing and completing the document was a condition of
her continuing employment, but the EAA itself actually stated that the agreement was executed "in
consideration of employment or continued employment" with Everglades College. Id. Additionally, the
EAA stated that its requirements would "survive the termination of the employee's employment." Id.
"Although the EAA invited employees to obtain legal counsel and negotiate over its terms, no employ-
ee actually did so." Id.
11. Id. at *8. Because the employees initially had difficulty accessing the documents, Everglades
College extended the deadline to June 29, 2012. Id.
12. Id. at *9-10.
13. Id.
14. Id. at *10.
15. Id. at * 10-11.
16. Id. at *1.
17. National Labor Relations Act, 29 USCA § 158 (West). "(a) Unfair labor practices by employer.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title . . ."; National Labor Relations
Act, 29 USCA § 157 (West)."Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title." Id.
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quired its employees to sign the EAA, the language of which led employees to
believe they were unable to file charges with the NLRB, and (2) required employ-
ees to waive their right to participate in class or collective action, and (3) termi-
nated Fikki's employment because she did not sign the EAA. Everglades Col-
lege denied the alleged violations and defended the legality of its EAA and its
actions.1 9
The NLRB, in an opinion by Administrative Law Judge Melissa M. Olivero,
ruled in favor of Fikki.20 Judge Olivero found that the EAA language at issue
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA because the Agreement reasonably led em-
ployees to believe that they were barred or restricted "from exercising their right
to file charges with the National Labor and Relations Board." 21 Further, Judge
Olivero held that the EAA violated section 8(a)(1) when it required "employees to
waive their right to collectively pursue employment-related issues."22 Lastly,
Judge Olivero determined that Everglades College violated the NLRA when it
discharged Fikki because the College "engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce."23 Everglades College was required to rescind or revise the Employee
Arbitration Agreement and offer Fikki reinstatement with back pay.24 In sum, the
Administrative Law Judge held that employers violate the NLRA when they re-
quire employees, as a condition of continuing employment, to sign arbitration
agreements that employees reasonably believe restrict them from filing charges
with the NLRB and require them to waive their rights to class or collective ac-
tions.25
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legality of employee arbitration agreements has been a hotly debated is-
sue, especially those agreements that include mandatory arbitration provisions and
require the waiver of class or collective actions.2 6 Federal courts have consistently
cited the FAA as controlling whether arbitration agreements are valid. 27 The most
frequently litigated FAA claims involve section 2 of the FAA.28 Section 2 treats
arbitration agreements like contracts, and interprets the agreements using contract
law principles.2 9 Using this line of reasoning, courts have liberally construed arbi-
18. Everglades Coll., Inc., 2013 WL 4140317, at *22-23.
19. Id. at *1.
20. Id. at *22-24.
21. Id. at *22-23.
22. Id.
23. Id. at *23.
24. Id. at *23-24.
25. Id. at *22-24.
26. See supra note 2.
27. "The FAA was originally enacted in 1925, 43 STAT. 883, and then reenacted and codified in
1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code. Its purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility
to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American
courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Gilmer, 500
U.S. at 24.
28. Section 2 of the FAA states: "[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2014).
29. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
13 1
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tration agreements in favor of binding arbitration. 30 Conversely, the NLRB has
treated claims involving violations of employee arbitration agreements very dif-
ferently, relying on sections 7 'and 832 of the NLRA.3 3 In interpreting these sec-
tions of the NLRA, the NLRB has used a more conservative standard in analyzing
the validity of mandatory employee arbitration agreements.34 The law regarding
such agreements, both under the FAA and the NLRA, has undergone significant
changes since the 1990s, and continues to develop today.
A. Arbitration Agreements Under The FAA
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,3 5 a 1991 United States Supreme
Court decision, was a landmark case decided under the FAA. At issue in this case
was an employee's required registration application, 36 which contained an arbitra-
tion agreement requiring arbitration of all claims against the employer.37  Despite
the agreement's language, the employee filed suit against his employer in district
court alleging that his termination violated the Age Discrimination and Employ-
ment Act of 1976 ("ADEA").3 ' The District Court for the Western District of
North Carolina ruled in favor of the employee, but the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed.
Relying on section 2 of the FAA,39 the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate
Court's decision and determined that the employee's age discrimination claim was
subject to compulsory arbitration and could not be litigated in district court.40 The
Supreme Court explained that section 2 of the FAA manifests a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements." 41 Citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Sol-
er Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court explained that the FAA protects the rights
of parties to agree to resolve statutory claims, like the ADEA claim, in an arbitral
30. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
31. Section 7 of the NLRA:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
32. Section 8(a)(1): "[u]nfair labor practices by employer. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section [7] of this title .. ." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
33. See D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184; U-Haul Co. of Ca. and Machinist District Lodge 190,
347 NLRB 375 (2006); see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 255 (2009) (in which the
Supreme Court explained, "The NLRA governs federal labor-relations law").
34. See D. R. Horton, 357 NLRB No. 184; Martin Luther Mem'l Home, Inc., 343 NLRB 646
(2004); U-Haul Co. of Ca., 347 NLRB at 379; 2 Sisters Food Grp., Inc., 357 NLRB No. 168 (Dec. 29,
2011).
35. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 22.
36. The employer required Gilmer to register as a securities representative with several stock ex-
changes. Such registration was achieved by filling out certain securities registration applications.
37. Id. The arbitration agreement did not require Gilmer to waive class or collective claims but just
required that all claims be arbitrated. Id.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 22.
40. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
41. See supra note 22.
4
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forum, "as long as a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute."42
Additionally, the Court explained that "the mere involvement of an adminis-
trative agency in the enforcement of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitra-
tion."43  Although the agreement at issue did not involve a class or collective
waiver, the Court still addressed the issue that class relief, which cannot be grant-
ed by an arbitrator, does not interfere with the individual resolution of disputes
with the arbitrator." The Court further reasoned that administrative agencies could
still grant class relief on behalf of such employees. 45 However, the Court noted
that arbitration may substitute for a judicial forum only if the litigant can effec-
tively vindicate his statutory rights through arbitration.46 Because the Court found
that the employee, Gilmer, was able to vindicate his rights under the ADEA
through arbitration, the Court held that the arbitration agreement was valid.47
In 1997, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, relying on Gilmer,
decided Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.48 The employment contract in Cole con-
tained a mandatory arbitration agreement but did not provide which party would
be responsible for the arbitrator's fees and expenses.49 In issuing its decision, the
Court made a clear distinction between "the arbitration of collective bargaining
agreements and mandatory arbitration agreements outside the context of collective
bargaining."so Further, the Court admitted that it was aware of the concerns about
mandatory employee arbitration agreements, including the "potential inequities
and inadequacies of arbitration in individual employment cases" and the ability of
arbitrators to "enforce" public laws that protect employees in the workplace. "
Nevertheless, the Court held that it was required to follow Gilmer and found that
42. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985)).
43. Id. "For example, the Securities Exchange Commission is heavily involved in the enforcement
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, but we have held that claims
under both of those statutes may be subject to compulsory arbitration." Id. at 28-29.
44. Id. "But 'even if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be
granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of bringing a collective
action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred."' Id. at 33
(quoting Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 241 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting)). "Fi-
nally, it should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing
actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief." Id. at 33.
45. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33. "Finally, it should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not
preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief." Id.
46. Id. The court admits that not all statutory claims are appropriate for arbitration, but if a party
bargains to arbitrate then "the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Id. at 26.
47. Id. at 35. Thus, the Court determined that "the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum . . ." Id. at 28.
48. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
49. Id. at 1483-84.
50. Id. at 1467. "In [making our decision], we are mindful of the clear distinctions between arbitra-
tion of labor disputes under a collective bargaining agreement and mandatory arbitration of individual
statutory claims outside of the context of collective bargaining." Id.
51. Id. (acknowledging, "We are also cognizant of the numerous concerns that have been voiced by
arbitrators, legal commentators, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") regarding the potential inequities and inadequacies of
arbitration in individual employment cases, as well as their concerns about the competence of arbitra-
tors and the arbitral forum to enforce effectively the myriad of public laws protecting workers and
regulating the workplace.").
5
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mandatory employee arbitration agreements are valid, as long as employees are
not required to pay for the arbitrator.5
A few years later, the United States Supreme Court handed down an even
broader decision, in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett.t In Pyett, a labor union entered
into an employee arbitration agreement, on behalf of its employees, which waived
the employees' individual rights to bring statutory claims in federal court.54 The
Supreme Court found no difference between arbitration agreements signed by
individual employees and those agreed to by union representatives." Instead, the
only significant requirement was that an agreement to arbitrate "statutory antidis-
crimination claims must be explicitly stated in the collective bargaining agree-
ment."56 Thus, relying on its prior interpretations of arbitration agreements under
the FAA, 5  the Supreme Court held that a union participating in collective bar-
gaining may agree to an arbitration clause that waives its members' rights to file
suit against their employers in court, for employment discrimination under the
ADEA .
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court addressed class arbitration again, in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.59 California's state contract laws specified
that class action waivers in arbitration clauses of adhesive consumer contracts
were unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. 60 However, the Supreme Court
determined that the FAA preempted California's law, and held that class action
waivers in consumer arbitration agreements are enforceable, under the FAA.61
Based on similar reasoning, in 2013 the Supreme Court decided American
Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. 62 This case involved merchants that filed a
class action antitrust suit against American Express Company, a credit issuer. 63
When the merchants began accepting American Express cards, they were required
to enter into a contract with the credit card user. The contract contained a manda-
tory arbitration clause, which only allowed individual arbitration.t The merchants
brought a class action against American Express, alleging that the company "used
its monopoly power in the market . . . to force merchants to accept credit cards at
rates approximately 30% higher than the fees for competing credit cards," in vio-
52. Id. at 1468. The statutory claims at issue included employees' right to bring an action in court
alleging employment discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. The Court stated, "We do not
read Gilmer as mandating the enforcement of all mandatory agreements to arbitrate statutory claims;
rather, we read Gilmer as requiring the enforcement of arbitration agreements that do not undermine
the relevant statutory scheme." Id.
53. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
54. Id. at 253.
55. Id. at 258.
56. Id. at 260 (finding that a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmis-
takably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims was enforceable as a matter of federal law).
57. The Court stated, "This Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can
be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving
employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law."' Id. at 266 (cit-
ing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (internal citations omitted)).
58. Id.
59. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1756 (emphasis added).
62. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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lation of federal antitrust law.6 5 The merchants argued that pursuing their claims
through individual arbitration would be too cost prohibitive.66
In evaluating the case, the Supreme Court discussed the purpose of the FAA,
explaining that it "reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of
contract." 67 The Court ruled that the FAA must "rigorously enforce" arbitration
agreements based on their terms.68 The Court found that this even included the
enforcement of agreements under which claims alleging the violation of a federal
statute arise. 69 The Court explained that the only exception to its rigorous en-
forcement of arbitration agreements is if the FAA's mandate is "overridden by a
contrary congressional command."o The Court ultimately held that "the FAA
does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the
ground that the plaintiffs cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim
exceeds the potential recovery."n These cases demonstrate the trend of federal
courts upholding arbitration agreements.
B. Arbitration Agreements Under The NLRA
Unlike the Supreme Court's Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") jurisprudence,
the National Labor and Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") has invalidated
employee arbitration agreements that are deemed to violate the NLRA. In a 2004
case, Martin Luther Memorial Home, Inc., the NLRB affirmed the standard for
review of NLRA Section 7 and Section 8(a)(1) claims.72 In this case, the Board
found that it is settled law that an employer violates NLRA Section 8(a)(1) 3 when
that employer enforces a work-related rule that reasonably chills employees' Sec-
tion 7 rights. 74 The Board explained that such rules place certain requirements
and restrictions on employees' work behaviors. Under the standard, the Board
must first determine whether the maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful.7 6
Such maintenance of a challenged rule is unlawful if the work rule "explicitly
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2309.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
71. Id. at 2306.
72. 343 NLRB 646 (2004). ("The Board has repeatedly recognized that mere maintenance of over-
broad work rules can violate Section 8(a)(1). Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825, 828 (1998);
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 NLRB 1126 (1978), enfd. 600 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1979).").
73. NLRA § 8(a)(1) ("(a) Unfair labor practices by employer. It shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section [7] of this title. . . .").
74. Martin Luther Mem 'l, 343 NLRB at 646. NLRA § 7 provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a)(3) of this title.
Martin Luther Mem 'l, 343 NLRB at 646.
75. Id. at 647.
76. Id. at 646.
135
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restricts activities protected by Section 7."" However, if the rule does not explicit-
ly restrict Section 7 activities, then an employee-claimant must prove that (1)
reasonable employees would construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity,
(2) the work rule was developed in response to union activity, or (3) the work rule
has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights. 8
Applying the same rules, the NLRB decided U-Haul Co. of California, in
2006.79 U-Haul involved a mandatory arbitration agreement that employees had to
sign as a condition of employment.80 The agreement required arbitration of all
claims "relating to or arising out of an employee's employment with [U-Haul] or
the termination of that employment."8 ' The agreement listed specific examples of
the types of claims covered by the arbitration agreement, and included a catchall
provision that forbade employees from filing "any other legal or equitable claims
and causes of action recognized by local, state or federal law or regulations." 82
The Board interpreted the catchall provision as limiting the types of claims cov-
ered by the arbitration agreement, and found that provision did not explicitly re-
strict Section 7 activity.83 Instead, the Board held that reasonable employees could
construe the agreement as prohibiting employees from filing claims for unfair
labor practices with the Board.84 Consequently, the Board held that the arbitration
agreement violated the NLRA and was unenforceable.85
In 2 Sisters Food Grp., Inc.,86 a case factually similar to U-Haul, the NLRB
decided that the employee arbitration agreement at issue, which required arbitra-
tion of all claims that "may lawfully be resolved by arbitration," could reasonably
lead employees to believe they were prohibited from bringing unfair labor practic-
es claims against their employer.8' In essence, the language of the agreement was
so broad that it reasonably led employees to believe they were even prohibited
from filing claims with the Board. Thus, the NLRB again determined that the
employee arbitration agreement at issue violated the NLRA.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 647.





84. Id. However, the breadth of the policy language, referencing the policy's applicability to causes
of action recognized by "federal law or regulations," would reasonably be read by employees to
prohibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board. Plainly, the employees would rea-
sonably construe the remedies for violations of the National Labor Relations Act as included among
the legal claims recognized by Federal law that are covered by the policy. Thus, we find that the lan-
guage of the policy is reasonably read to require employees to resort to the Respondent's arbitration
procedures instead of filing charges with the Board. Id.
85. Id. at 378.
86. 357 NLRB. No. 168 (Dec. 29, 2011).
87. Id. at *2. "[As in U-Haul], the limiting language in the Respondent's arbitration policy does not
by its terms specifically exclude NLRB proceedings, and "most nonlawyer employees" would not be
sufficiently familiar with the limitations the Act imposes on mandatory arbitration for the language to
be effective." Id.
88. U-Haul, 347 NLRB. at 378; 2 Sisters, 357 NLRB No. 168 at *44.
[Vol. 2014136
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C. Current Case Law & Split Authority
In 2012, the NLRB finally addressed the inconsistency between its analysis of
arbitration agreements under the NLRA and the Supreme Court's FAA jurispru-
dence, in D. R. Horton, Inc. and Michael Cuda.9 D.R. Horton involved a home-
builder that operated in more than 20 states.90 Horton, the employer, required its
employees to sign an arbitration agreement, which provided that all employment-
related disputes would be resolved through individual, rather than collective, arbi-
tration.91 The issue before the NLRB was whether such restriction of an employ-
ee's right to bring claims against his employer, in any forum, directly violated the
substantive rights granted to employees in sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. 92
The Board explained that "Section 7 of the NLRA vests employees with a
substantive right to engage in specified forms of associational activity."93 The
NLRB also discussed the FAA precedent established in Gilmer.94 The Board
found that, under the facts in D.R. Horton, there was no conflict between the
NLRA and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA. 95 The NLRB ex-
plained that the Gilmer decision allowed parties to substitute arbitration for a judi-
cial forum only so long as the litigant could effectively vindicate his statutory
rights through arbitration. 96 Additionally, the Board distinguished the Supreme
Court's restriction on compelling class arbitration in Concepcion, as the arbitra-
tion agreement at issue in Concepcion was part of a consumer contract, not an
employment agreement. 97 In Horton, however, the NLRB found that "employers
cannot compel employees to waive their NLRA right to collectively pursue litiga-
tion of employment claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial." 98
The Board further explained that upholding employees' rights under the
NLRA does not require the availability of class-wide arbitration, as long as em-
ployment agreements provide employees with a judicial forum for class and col-
lective claims. 99 Thus, the NLRB held that employers may continue to require the
89. See generally In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB. No. 184.
90. Id. at*1.
9 1. Id.
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. The Board continued, "It provides in relevant part that employees shall have the right 'to
engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion . . .' 29 U.S.C. § 157. It is well settled that 'mutual aid or protection' includes employees' efforts to
'improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through
channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship."' (citing Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 556, 565-566 (1978)). "The Supreme Court specifically stated in Eastex that Section 7 'protects
employees from retaliation by their employer when they seek to improve their working conditions
through resort to administrative and judicial forums.' Id. at 565-566. The same is equally true of resort
to arbitration." In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, at *2.
94. Id. at*ll1.
95. Id. at * 10. The NLRB noted, "However, the breadth of the policy language, referencing the
policy's applicability to causes of action recognized by 'federal law or regulations,' would reasonably
be read by employees to prohibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board. Plainly, the
employees would reasonably construe the remedies for violations of the National Labor Relations Act
as included among the legal claims recognized by Federal law that are covered by the policy. Thus, we
find that the language of the policy is reasonably read to require employees to resort to the Respond-
ent's arbitration procedures instead of filing charges with the Board." U-Haul, 347 N.L.R.B. at 377.
96. In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184, at * 11.
97. Id. at *15-16.
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individual arbitration of employees' claims under the NLRA, but may not com-
pletely foreclose an employee's access to collective action.100
Many courts have criticized the NLRB's decision in D. R. Horton.101 In Suth-
erland v. Ernst & Young LLP, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declined to
follow D. R. Horton, arguing that the NLRB did not have the necessary quorum to
make a decision.102 Courts that have declined to follow D.R. Horton have instead
relied on Concepcion,103 arguing that, after Concepcion, arbitration agreements
that prohibit collective action are enforceable. 1 4 Although the NLRB's construc-
tion of the NLRA is entitled to deference, the NLRB has no special competence or
experience interpreting the FAA.10 Therefore, several courts have argued that,
unlike the Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion, the NLRB's FAA decisions
are not controlling. 106
Conversely, most NLRB opinions have cited D.R. Horton with approval and
have adopted its reasoning. 107 These NLRB opinions contend that the Supreme
Court precedent is inapplicable to NLRB cases, because the Supreme Court cases
do not address the same facts or law.10s Therefore, they contend that D.R Horton
is controlling in the employment law context.1 09
In February 2013, appeal of the NLRB's D.R. Horton decision began, in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case is still under review. In the meantime,
NLRB Administrative Law Judge Olivero relied on D.R. Horton in deciding Ev-
erglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki.110 Numerous other Administrative Law Judges have
subsequently followed Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki and have issued opinions
based on the reasoning in D.R. Horton, rather than the Supreme Court's FAA
decisions.1
IV. INSTANT DECISION
NLRB Administrative Law Judge Melissa Olivero decided Everglades Col-
lege, Inc., & Fikki, on August 14, 2013.112 Judge Olivero first determined that
Everglades College was an employer within the meaning of the NLRA, giving the
100. Id.
101. See Sutherland, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F.
Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
102. Id.
103. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). In Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that, under the
FAA, California must enforce arbitration agreements, even if they require that consumer complaints be
arbitrated individually, foreclosing collective action. Under Concepcion, the FAA preempted Califor-
nia's judicial rule concerning the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts.
Id.
104. See Sutherland, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
105. St. John's Mercy Health Sys. v. NLRB, 436 F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2006)
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 72-89.
108. See Cellular Sales of Mo, LLC & John Bauer, 14-CA-094714, WL 4427452 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges Aug. 19, 2013); Chesapeake Energy Corp. & Bruce Escovedo, 14-CA-100530, WL 5984336
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Nov. 8, 2013); Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. v. Linares, S 31-CA-072179,
2013 WL 5984335 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Nov. 8, 2013).
109. Id.
110. Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 (N.L.R.B Div. of Judges) (Aug. 14, 2013).
111. See supra note 108.
112. Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at *7.
[Vol. 2014138
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NLRB jurisdiction over the claims.113 The Board explained that the employer,
Everglades College, violated section 8(a)(1)1 14 of the NLRA when it implemented
work requirements that explicitly restricted its employees' ability to exercise their
section 7 rights."' In addition, the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by maintain-
ing "work rules that tend[ed] to chill employees in their exercise of their Section 7
rights."1 16
Judge Olivero explained that an employer's work rule that explicitly restricts
an employee's exercise of his section 7 rights is a direct violation of the NLRA,
regardless of the employer's intent." On the other hand, in order for an employee
to prove that an employer's work rule chilled his exercise of his section 7 rights,
the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's
work rule (1) could have reasonably been construed to prohibit section 7 activity,
(2) was adopted due to union activity, or (3) was implemented to restrict employee
section 7 activity."
Applying these standards to the facts in Everglades College, Inc., & Fikki, the
Board found that Everglades College's Employee Arbitration Agreement ("EAA"
or "Agreement") did not "explicitly restrict employees" from filing claims with
the NLRB, since the EAA's requirement that all employee claims be arbitrated
contained the exception, "except where specifically prohibited by law."1 19 Reason-
ing that employees cannot be required to understand all federal, state, and local
laws specifically prohibiting mandatory arbitration,120 the Board ruled that the
EAA would "reasonably be read by employees to prohibit the filing of unfair la-
bor practice charges with the Board." Thus, rather than explicitly restricting an
employee from filing claims with the NLRB, the Board found that the EAA's
broad and ambiguous language could lead reasonable employees to believe they
113. Id. at *20. "Respondent ... is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2 (2), (6) and (7) of the [NLRA] and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the [NLRA]." Id.
114. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A § 158 (West) ( "[Section 8] (a) Unfair labor practices
by employer. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-- (1) to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title . .
115. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A § 157 (West).
[Section 7] Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a)(3) of
this title.
Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at * 1l (citing Luther Heritage Village-Livonia, 343
NLRB 646 (2004)).
116. Everglades Coll., Inc. & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at *11.
117. Id. (citing Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 369, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). This builds off
of Martin Luther Mem'1 Home, Inc.. See supra notes 34, 74.
118. Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at *11.
However, where a workplace rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity, the General
Counsel must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) employees would rea-
sonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the employer adopted the rule in
response to union activity; or (3) the employer applied a rule to restrict employee Section 7
activity.
Id. (citing Luther Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004)).
119. Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at *12-13.
120. Id. at *13-14. The NLRB found that the EAA's ambiguous exception should be construed
against Everglades College. Id.
11
Greenwade: Future of Mandatory Employee Arbitration Agreements, The
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
140 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2014
were barred from filing charges with the NLRB.121 As such, the NLRB held that
Everglades College's EAA violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, because it had a
chilling effect on employee Lisa Fikki's exercise of her section 7 rights. 122
Next, the Board reviewed the EAA's requirement that employees waive their
rights to class or collective actions. 123 Relying in large part on the same reasoning
stated above and emphasizing its reasoning in D. R. Horton, the Board held that
an employer cannot require employees to waive "their NLRA right to collectively
pursue litigation of employment claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial."
Everglades College argued that its EAA did not prevent employees from tak-
ing collective action, as it allowed employees to file claims with the NLRB, which
had the authority to pursue class or collective actions, on behalf of employees, in
court.124 The Board rejected this argument, explaining that the EAA's broad,
ambiguous, and vague language would "reasonably be read by employees to pro-
hibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board." 125 Further, the
EAA deterred employees from seeking judicial redress, because the terms of the
EAA required an employee to reimburse Everglades College for "all costs and
expenses arising out of a breach of the agreement." 126 Therefore, the NLRB held
that the EAA's requirement that employees waive their rights to bring employ-
ment-related class or collective actions against Everglades College violated sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.127
Lastly, the NLRB held that, because the EEA was unlawful, Fikki's discharge
for failing to sign the EAA was also unlawful.128 Everglades' discharge of Fikki
121. Id. at *12-13.
I find that the EAA's broad language, applying to all causes of action for discrimination or
harassment under Federal, State, or local laws, would reasonably be read by employees to
prohibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the Board. It is axiomatic that the
National Labor Relations Act is a Federal law prohibiting discrimination based upon union
or other protected, concerted activity. An employee could easily construe the EAA to re-
quire arbitration of claimed violations of the Act, a Federal law. Therefore, I find that that
the language of the EAA is reasonably read to require employees to resort to Respondent's
arbitration procedures instead of filing charges with the Board.
Id.
122. Id. at *5-6; [Clause] 6.
Arbitration of Claims. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to Employee's
employment, Employee's separation from employment, and this Agreement, including, but
not limited to, claims or actions brought pursuant to federal, state, or local laws regarding
payment of wages, tort, discrimination, harassment and retaliation, except where specifical-
ly prohibited by law, shall be referred to and finally resolved exclusively by binding arbitra-
tion . . . Employee agrees that there will be no right or authority, and hereby waives any
right or authority, for any claims within the scope of this Agreement to be brought, heard or
arbitrated as a class or collective action, or in a representative or private attorney general
capacity on behalf of a class of persons or the general public.
Id.
123. Id.
Employee agrees that there will be no right or authority, and hereby waives any right or au-
thority, for any claims within the scope of this Agreement to be brought, heard or arbitrated
as a class or collective action, or in a representative or private attorney general capacity on
behalf of a class of persons or the general public.
Id. (citing In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 at *12-13).
124. Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at *17.
125. Id. at *17-18.
126. Id. at *16-17.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *18 (citing Supply Technologies, LLC, 359 NLRB No. 38 slip op. at 1 (2012)).
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was an "unfair labor practice[] affecting commerce," in violation of sections
8(a)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the NLRA.129 The Board rejected Everglades Col-
lege's argument that numerous courts have upheld collective action waivers in
arbitration agreements, explaining that the NLRB is required to follow NLRA
precedent that "neither the Board nor the Supreme Court has reversed." Ever-
glades College was required to rescind or revise the EAA and offer Fikki rein-
statement with back pay.130 The NLRB held that employers violate the NLRA
when they condition continued employment on signing an arbitration agreement
that reasonably restricts the employee from filing charges with the NLRB and
requires employees to waive their rights to all collective actions. 3
V. COMMENT
Everglades College, Inc., & Fikki represents the NLRB's developing juris-
prudence, restricting the use of mandatory employee arbitration agreements, espe-
cially those that require employees to waive their right to collective action.132 The
decision demonstrates the NLRB's continued progression from the FAA's "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." 3 The split of authority between
the NLRA and FAA has made it difficult to apply the law regarding mandatory
employee arbitration agreements.134 As Everglades College, Inc., & Fikki and
recent decisions that following it demonstrate, the split continues to deepen, mak-
ing interpreting and applying the law increasingly challenging.
The decisions applying the NLRA's stricter interpretation of employee arbi-
tration agreements frequently mention that the Supreme Court has not addressed
the interrelationship between the NLRA and the FAA, as it specifically applies to
mandatory employee arbitration agreements. 13  The NLRB decisions recognize
the Supreme Court's FAA precedent, but argue that such cases are inapplicable
because they do not address the same facts or law. 136 Consequently, NLRB Judges
have implied that, until the Supreme Court addresses the interrelationship between
the NLRA and the FAA in the context of employee arbitration agreements, the
129. Id. at *23.
130. Id. at *23-24.
131. Id. at *22-24.
132. See Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC & John Bauer, 14-CA-094714, 2013 WL 4427452
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Aug. 19, 2013); Chesapeake Energy Corp. & Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary
Chesapeake Operating, Inc. & Bruce Escovedo, 14-CA-100530, 2013 WL 5984336 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges Nov. 8, 2013); Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. & Charles Dunaway & Walter Linares, S 31-
CA-072179, 2013 WL 5984335 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Nov. 8, 2013).
133. See supra note 4.
134. See Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC & John Bauer, 14-CA-094714, 2013 WL 4427452
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Aug. 19, 2013); Chesapeake Energy Corp. & Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary
Chesapeake Operating, Inc. & Bruce Escovedo, 14-CA-100530, 2013 WL 5984336 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges Nov. 8, 2013); Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. & Charles Dunaway & Walter Linares, S 31-
CA-072179, 2013 WL 5984335 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Nov. 8, 2013).
135. Id.
136. See also Chesapeake Energy Corp., 14-CA-100530, 2013 WL 5984336 (Where the NLRB stated
that,"The claim brought by the merchants in American Express Co., is distinguishable [from the claim
at issue here] in that it was for a violation of antitrust laws. Unlike D.R. Horton and the case at issue,
the merchants were alleging not that they were precluded from pursuing their claim but rather the cost
to do so individually would be prohibitive." Cellular Sales; In this regard, I note that the identical issue
presented in this case was not addressed in the Supreme Court's American Express decision.).
141
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NLRB will continue to follow D.R. Horton."' As such, the NLRB will likely
continue to invalidate arbitration agreements in favor of employees.
In direct contrast to the NLRB's reasoning, Courts construe arbitration
agreements liberally under the FAA, favoring arbitration.3  Proponents of the
Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the FAA argue that NLRB decisions
interpreting both the NLRA and the FAA are not entitled to deference, as the
NLRB has no special competence or experience interpreting the FAA.13 9 Thus,
many argue that while the NLRB's construction of the NLRA is entitled to some
deference, decisions like D.R. Horton,140 interpreting the FAA and the NLRA,
should be overturned. 141 FAA proponents have also consistently argued that D.R.
Horton was decided under an improper quorum.1 In fact, several courts have
refused to consider the D.R. Horton ruling when deciding cases regarding em-
ployee arbitration agreements.143
For these reasons, the NLRB's D.R. Horton ruling was appealed to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in February 2013, and is currently pending review.1 44
The Fifth Circuit, known for its conservative decisions, could overturn the case
based on the improper quorum. 145 As the NLRB's leading decision on the validity
of arbitration agreements in employment contracts, the invalidation of D.R. Hor-
ton would exacerbate the confusion among NLRB judges.1 46
However, if D.R. Horton is overturned, the next case in line for appellate re-
view would likely be Everglades College, Inc., & Fikki, as it is the most recent
NLRB decision regarding mandatory employee arbitration agreements.1 47 Im-
portantly, if the NLRB reviews Everglades College in the future, there will be
137. Id.
138. See supra note 4.
139. Spears et. al v. MidAmerica Waffles, No. 2:11-cv-02273-CM-JPO (D. Kan. July 2, 2012). The
court reviewed D.R. Horton and found that, although Concepcion may not speak directly to the issue
before the court, it does illustrate a guiding principle: Arbitration agreements are enforceable even
when they prohibit the use of a class action. And it stands "against any argument that an absolute right
to collective action is consistent with the FAA's 'over-arching purpose' of 'ensur[ing] the enforcement
of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings."' Id.
140. Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at *12-13.
141. See Sutherland, 726 F.3d 290; Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831
(N.D. Cal. 2012); Owen v. Bristol Care, 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
142. Id.
143. See Sutherland, 726 F.3d 290; Bristol Care, 702 F.3d 1050.
144. The Fifth Circuit issued its decision on December 3, 2013. The Court held that the NLRB's
quorum was valid. Additionally, the Court determined that the FAA's saving clause did not apply, and
neither the NLRA's legislative history nor its text included any congressional command overriding the
FAA. Essentially, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the NLRB's decision in D.R. Horton violated the FAA.
This has not been taken up by the Supreme Court and is specific to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals.
145. The Associated Press, Obama could reshape conservative 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
Nola, Dec. 26, 2012, available at
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/12/obama could reshape conservati.html, ("The 5th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans is widely viewed as one of the nation's most conserva-
tive federal appellate courts. . .").
146. It is also possible the case would also be reversed due to its interpretation of the FAA and its
interpretation of the NLRA. If this happens, it is likely that Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki will still be
taken to the Board and then further appealed to federal court in a different circuit.
147. See Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC & John Bauer, 14-CA-094714, 2013 WL 4427452
(N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Aug. 19, 2013); Chesapeake Energy Corp. & Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary
Chesapeake Operating, Inc. & Bruce Escovedo, 14-CA-100530, 2013 WL 5984336 (N.L.R.B. Div. of
Judges Nov. 8, 2013); Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc. & Charles Dunaway & Walter Linares, S 31-
CA-072179, 2013 WL 5984335 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges Nov. 8, 2013).
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time to ensure that a proper quorum is established. Additionally, Everglades Col-
lege, Inc., & Fikki differs from D.R. Horton in that Fikki, an employee, was fired
for not signing the mandatory employee arbitration agreement by a specific dead-
line.1 48 This difference makes Everglades College, Inc., & Fikki more likely to
survive appellate review.
The Supreme Court should take up Everglades College, Inc., & Fikki, or a
case with similar facts, as soon as possible, in order to establish a uniform stand-
ard rule regarding employment arbitration agreements, and to eliminate confusion.
The Court must make it clear that when a collective interest of concerted action, a
statutory right under the NLRA, 149 is involved the FAA's liberal interpretation
favoring arbitration conflicts with Congressional intent underlying the NLRA and
creates a public policy issue which no court has yet addressed. 150 The Supreme
Court should rule that the FAA's preference for arbitration must give way, not
only because section 7 of the NLRA is a statutory right, but also because it is
based on concerted activity of section 7 rights. To rule otherwise would chill em-
ployee rights, statutorily guaranteed under the NLRA, and would empower em-
ployers to unjustly fire employees that attempt to enforce their statutory rights.
Until the Supreme Court decides and explains interrelationship of the FAA
and the NLRA, and promulgates standards by which employers must abide and to
which employees can agree, there will be no uniform law on the enforceability of
mandatory employment arbitration agreement waivers of class arbitration. The
lack of legal uniformity will not only cause increased litigation, but a misunder-
standing and mistrust of laws that produce such varied results in cases where the
facts are so similar.
VI. CONCLUSION
Everglades College, Inc., & Fikki elucidates the deepening split in the law
surrounding mandatory employee arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court
should make a uniform standard for such agreements to ensure that employees can
enforce their statutory rights. Without a uniform standard, litigation of this con-
flicting issue under the NLRA and FAA will continue, and even more time and
money will be expended in pursuit of a uniform standard. The Supreme Court
must develop a uniform standard to inform employers of the limitations placed on
employment contracts, and to ensure that employees know the extent of, and can
vindicate their statutory rights.
MARCY GREENWADE
148. Everglades Coll., Inc., & Fikki, 2013 WL 4140317 at *12-13. The agreement also disallowed
any class or collective claims, unless otherwise legal. Id.
149. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 157.
150. See supra note 50.
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